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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
A, a United States corporation, announces a cash tender offer
during a take-over attempt. A is willing to pay $45 per share for the
target company, B, while the pre-offer market price was only $30 per
share. The SEC starts to investigate the trading in B's stock prior to
the offer. Order tickets and confirmations, made available by United
States broker-dealers, prove that large amounts of B shares have
been purchased by a foreign bank immediately before the announce-
ment of the tender offer. Informal requests are fruitless and the SEC
serves a subpoena at the foreign bank's New York branch which or-
ders the bank to disclose the names of the customers involved in the
transaction. The bank refuses to comply because the disclosure
would violate foreign secrecy laws. The question before the SEC now
is what steps should it take in order to obtain the needed information
despite the bank's refusal to cooperate.
Difficulties in the enforcement of United States securities laws in
cases involving foreign elements are not restricted to the cases of in-
sider trading. Similar problems arise in connection with other situa-
tions such as the violation of the disclosure provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by foreign issuers, the sale of unreg-
istered securities, or investigations of foreign accounting firms.2 The
question is whether the enforcement tools available to the SEC and
the courts are sufficient to cope with such situations efficiently.
. International Capital Markets and National Policies
The capital markets of the United States are increasingly af-
fected by transactions initiated outside their borders. From 1978 to
1983, purchases of corporate stocks and bonds in the United States
by foreign investors (private and institutional) increased from $23.6
billion to $79.8 billion. Total foreign investment in the United States
increased from $25.6 billion in 1971 to $42.4 billion in 1978 and
$133.5 billion in 1983. 3 While the internationalization of the capital
markets continues, the governing laws remain confined to national
boundaries. For example, the attitudes toward insider trading still
1. See Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(j) (1984).
2. Cf. Request for Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve the Commission's Abil-
ity to Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in U.S. Markets from
Other Countries, [1984 Transfer-Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,648 at I1(B) (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Request for Comments].
3. See id. at I.B.
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differ widely from country to country. In most European countries
misuse of insider trading is not recognized as a criminal offense and
rarely serves as a basis for civil liability: France, Great Britain and
Denmark have enacted penal provisions to cover trading on inside
information. Norway requires registration of transactions in a com-
pany's shares whenever these transactions involve the company's top
executives. Germany and the Netherlands have relied on rules of
professional ethics in this area, an approach which is also envisaged
by the EEC. In Switzerland, a report on an insider trading sanction
provision, amending the Penal Code, has recently been released for
public comment.4 The most important reason for the reluctance to
punish in Europe is that insider transactions so far have not posed
the striking problems they have in the United States.' For example,
tender offers of fifty per cent over the prior market price are a typical
United States phenomenon.
Beyond the considerable differences in substantive securities and
corporate law, enforcement policies also differ widely. In Japan, for
example, although the United States rule lOb-5 has been adopted lit-
erally, not a single case has been brought under this provision.6 Fi-
nally, with regard to business and banking secrets, European
attitudes differ widely from the American view. Protection against
disclosure has not only a long tradition, but has in some countries
also become a major issue of modem constitutional (civil rights)
law." This short survey has demonstrated that securities law enforce-
ment proceedings in cases with foreign elements tend to be substan-
tially more complicated than pure domestic proceedings. There are,
however, several ways in which the SEC can enforce Securities Law.
C. The Basic Three Level Enforcement Pattern
The SEC initiates informal, preliminary investigations, if its own
market surveillance operations or complaints from the public indi-
4. Cf De Capitani, Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct, "6 J. COMp. Bus. & CAP.
M.L. 7 (1984). For a general survey see Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Develop-
ments: an InternationalAnalysis, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 335 (1982); Hopt, Insider Trad-
ing on the Continent, 4 J. COMp. Bus. & CAP. M. L. 379 (1982). For a critical American
comment on insider trading regulation see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966).
5. De Capitani, supra note 4, at 7.
6. Commission Bancaire (France), Compte Rendu du Colloque Organise a Geneve 8
1984 (copy on file with California Western International Law Journal).
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cate that securities laws may have been violated.8 During the infor-
mal investigations evidence can be obtained only on a voluntary
basis. The full range of investigatory power-for example, power to
take oaths, subpoena witnesses, compel the production of docu-
ments-is available to the SEC only after having issued a formal or-
der of investigation.9 Formal investigations often are nonpublic.'0
The willingness of witnesses to cooperate in domestic investigations
usually makes the display of the SEC's full investigatory power un-
necessary." If there is no cooperation, however, the SEC can make
use of its mentioned powers under the SEA and the SA. In case of a
witness' refusal to comply with a valid SEC subpoena, the Commis-
sion may ask a federal district court to enforce its subpoena by issu-
ing a court order for compliance. Disobedience of the court order
may be punished as contempt of court, 2 while failure to comply with
the SEC subpoena alone is, under SEA § 21 (not under the SA), only
considered a misdemeanor.
Upon completion of an investigation, the SEC has several alter-
natives: it may proceed administratively, civilly or criminally; it may
proceed under a combination of any of these alternatives; or it may
stop further proceedings altogether.
Examples of further administrative proceedings are stop orders
suspending the "effectiveness" of a registration statement, if it does
not meet the required standards,' 3 and disciplinary measures with
respect to broker-dealers such as: censure, limitation on activities,
and suspension and revocation of registration because of false and
misleading statements. 1"
Civil Proceedings. Civil actions in federal courts have been in-
creasingly used by the SEC to get injunctive relief.'" The SEC may,
for example, try to get a temporary restraining order to freeze assets
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1973) [hereinafter cited as
S.E.A.]; Securities Act of 1933 § 2d(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1973) [hereinafter cited as S.A.].
(Subsequent citations refer to the section numbers of the original Acts, not the U.S. Code).
9. S.E.A. § 21(b); S.A. § 19(b). See Investigations by the Commission, 3 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 26,356 (1984).
10. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(a), 203.5 (1980).
11. For example, in 1977 only 224 formal orders were issued. See H. FRIEDMAN, SECURI-
TIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 5 n.9 (1981).
12. S.E.A. § 21(c); S.A. § 22(b).
13. S.A. § 8(d).
14. S.E.A. § 15(b)(4).
15. S.E.A. §§ 21(d)(1), 27; S.A. §§ 20(b), 22. See also Injunctions; Prosecution of Offenses,
3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,391 (1984). Critical with regard to the injunctive remedy is
Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunctions: It's Time to Give the Commission an Administrative
Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 SEC. REG. L. J. 345 (1979).
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on a brokerage account which are possibly the result of illegal insider
trading.' 6 According to SEA § 21 (d)(2), added by the Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act of 1984, the SEC also may bring an action against
insiders to impose a "civil penalty" up to three times the profit
gained through the illegal trading. Thus the SEC is no longer re-
stricted to the disgorgement of profits remedy.' 7 The "civil penalty"
may prove an important enforcement tool, especially if the deterrent
effect of private lOb-5 actions'8 is reduced by limitations of the in-
sider's liability,' 9 and if the courts cut back the availability of deriva-
tive suits by acknowledging further procedural requirements.20
Where a case is referred to the Department of Justice or the U.S.
Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution,2' a further investigation
will be undertaken through use of a grand jury.22 In order to take
advantage of the SEC staff's knowledge of the case under investiga-
tion, a frequent practice has developed to appoint SEC staff members
to be Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to assist in the grand jury in-
vestigation. Despite the potential conflict of interest this practice has
usually been upheld by the courts and approved by Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(3) as adopted in 1977.23
The special problems of parallel civil-criminal proceedings can
only be mentioned here.24
II. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN CASES WITH
FOREIGN ELEMENTS
A. Introduction
The securities law enforcement pattern has, as we have seen, a
three-level structure similar to that in the antitrust field:2, agency
enforcement through administrative and civil proceedings (injunc-
16. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. II I (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
17. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
19. Cf Friedrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).
20. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
21. S.E.A. § 21(d)(1).
22. The bases of criminal liability are found in S.A. § 24 and S.E.A. § 32. See generally
Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions under the Federal Securities Law and Related Statutes: The
Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971).
23. See H. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 17-19.
24. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 447 U.S. 993 (1980); United States v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); SEC v.
Horowitz & Ullman P.C., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,488 (1978).
25. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMIDT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATIONS 121 (2d ed. 1983).
Vol. 16
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tions, "civil penalties" in insider cases), private lawsuits (private at-
torney general idea) and criminal prosecutions. The federal district
courts have original and, at least under the SEA, exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases2 6 . Foreign elements
being involved in a given case, there arise three basic jurisdictional
problems in each of the mentioned enforcement situations:
-Thefirst question is whether the United States securities laws
are applicable. Courts usually address this choice of law problem
under the heading "subject matter jurisdiction."27 However, in order
to avoid confusion with the identical term describing federal as op-
posed to state court power (for example, federal question or diversity
jurisdiction), it is preferable to use the term "jurisdiction to pre-
scribe," in accordance with the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law.28
-Second, in order to render a valid judgment or issue a valid
discovery order, a court must have "jurisdiction to adjudicate" the
case (minimum contacts, notice).29
-Third, and for purposes of this paper most important, a court
or the SEC must have power to compel the production of the evi-
dence necessary for an informed decision. This question, usually re-
ferred to as "jurisdiction to enforce,"" ° is especially troublesome
when parties, witnesses and documents are not found within the
United States."'
B. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Although this is not the place to discuss all aspects of the extra-
territorial application of the United States securities laws, three typi-
cal points should be mentioned.
1. The registration and prospectus requirements of SA §§ 5
and 10 apply to all foreign issuers that sell securities on United States
markets. Non-compliance may expose the issuer to criminal sanc-
tions under SA §§ 5 and 24 (failure to register) or civil liability under
26. S.E.A. § 27; S.A. § 22. The concurrent state court jurisdiction under S.A. § 22(a) is of
no practical importance.
27. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1975).
28. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(1) (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1982). See also Lowenfeld, Antitrust, Interest Analysis, and the New Confict of Law (Book
Review), 95 HARV. L. REV. 1976-94 (1982).
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at § 401(2). See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying
text.
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at § 401(3).
31. See infra notes 85-114 and accompanying text.
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SA §§ 11 and 12 (false prospectus).3 2 Jurisdictional problems arise
in this context on the level of jurisdiction to enforce, if, for example,
the truthfulness of a registration statement or prospectus is
challenged.
With regard to American issuers selling their securities on for-
eign markets, the registration requirement is likely to apply only
under circumstances when it is clearly foreseeable that the securities
will be resold to purchasers in the United States.33 The reason for
the restriction is that this is the only time that the integrity of the
United States markets is affected.34
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the secon-
dary securities market as well. Registration under SEA § 12(g) trig-
gers a series of burdensome obligations and liabilities including
periodic reports,35 proxy statements36 and automatic insider liability
for short-swing profits37 .
The registration requirement of SEA § 12, as amended in 1964,
extends to every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce (in-
cluding foreign trade, SEA § 3(a)(17)), or whose securities are traded
by the mails in interstate commerce and which has total assets ex-
ceeding $1,000,000 and at least one class of equity securities held of
record by 500 or more persons. Foreign issuers, however, are ex-
empted under rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2, if their securities
are held by less than 300 U.S. residents or if they furnish to the SEC,
briefly spoken, all the information they must make public under the
laws of the state of incorporation or principal place of business.
38
The foreign issuer exemption includes the already mentioned follow-
up liabilities and obligations. Yet, it remains unclear whether the
failure of such issuers to comply with the conditions of rule 12g3-2
will subject them not only to the registration requirement under SEA
32. The term "interstate commerce" as used in S.A. § 5 is defined in S.A. § 2(7) as "'trade
or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the
several States . . or between any foreign country and any State." This is similar to S.E.A.
§ 3(a)(17).
33. See Matter of Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960).
34. But see lIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) concerning Rule
lOb-5.
35. S.E.A. § 13.
36. S.E.A. § 14(a).
37. S.E.A. § 16(b).
38. For a brief overview of the history of Rule 12g3-2 see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1053-55 (2d ed. 1976); for a more detailed discussion see
Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study in the Process of Ac-
commodating Foreign Interests 54 CORNELL L. REV. 358 (1969).
Vol. 16
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§ 12(g), but also to the reach of SEA § 14(a) or SEA § 16(d), and the
respective private causes of action. 9 Finally, in connection with the
foreign issuer exemption, it is worth noting that the SEC maintains a
Foreign Restricted List showing which foreign issuers have registerd
securities under SEA § 12(g), which issuers have obtained exemp-
tions, and which have failed to furnish any information.'
3. The extraterritorial reach of the anti-fraud provisions, above
all rule lOb-5, 4" has been outlined in several important cases. In
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Judge Friendly concluded:
[T]he anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws: (1)
[a]pply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in
the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act)
of material importance occurred in this country; and (2) [a]pply to
losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but
only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in
the United States have significantly contributed thereto; but (3)
[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.
42
In Bersch, only two factual connections with the United States ex-
isted. First, prior to the public offering of shares abroad various pre-
paratory meetings had been held in New York between
representatives and major underwriters. Second, the plaintiff Bersch
was a U.S. citizen and resident. The court noted at the outset that
the anti-fraud provisions apply to many transactions which are
neither within the registration requirements nor executed on U.S.
markets.4 3 It then noted that not even a substantial part of the fraud-
ulent conduct occurred within the United States (the final prospectus
emanated from London, Brussels and Toronto), and that mere pre-
39. See Buxbaum, supra note 38, at 363; cf Wagran v. Astle, [1974-75 Transfer-Binder],
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (the district court dismissed a § 16(d)
complaint against individual officers of a Canadian corporation, for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion over the individual defendants who were neither present nor doing business within the
U.S.).
40. Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, [1966-67 Transfer-Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,443 (1967).
41. Authorized by S.E.A. § 10(b) (fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of se-
curities). Further anti-fraud provisions are found in S.A. § 17(a) (fraud in connection with the
sale of securities), S.E.A. § 14(e) (fraud in connection with a tender offer), and S.E.A. § 14(d)
(fraud in proxy fights).
42. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nor.
Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
43. 519 F.2d at 986.
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paratory activities" per se are not enough to invoke U.S. jurisdiction
to prescribe. The court further indicated that a general adverse effect
of a fraudulent offering abroad on the domestic capital market would
also not suffice.45
If however, as in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,4 certain American
investors who bought shares of a Canadian corporation on a U.S.
exchange, incur losses because the issuing Canadian subsidiary was
fraudulently induced by the Canadian parent corporation to sell its
stock under value, rule lOb-5 applies.47
Where, as in IT v. Vencap48, a fraudulent scheme has effects on
foreign investors only outside the U.S., the securities laws neverthe-
less may apply, because their underlying policy is not "to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent se-
curity devices for export. . ."" The IT ruling is limited, how-
ever, to the perpetration within the United States of the fraudulent
acts themselves and does not extend to Bersch-type situations.50
These cases are digested in § 416 of the Restatement (Revised) of
Foreign Relations Law as follows:
(1) Any transaction in securities carried out, or intended to
be carried out, on a securities market in the United States is subject
to United States jurisdiction to prescribe, regardless of the nation-
ality or place of business of the participants in the transaction or of
the issuer of the securities.
(2) As regards transactions in securities not on a securities
market in the United States, but where
44. Judge Friendly cites the example of the shooting of a bullet across a state line and says
that in Bersch "at most the acts in the United States helped to make the gun whence the bullet
was fired from places abroad .. " Id. at 987.
45. Id. at 987-89; but cf in the antitrust field, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); even ifSchoenbaum can be accepted under securities law
policy considerations, the decision is very problematical because it involves questions of breach
of fiduciary duties which under choice of law principles should rather be governed by the law of
incorporation, i.e., Canadian law, see W. REESE AND M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
CASES AND MATERIALS, 981-984 (8th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 302 (1971). Cf also Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (where liability
under federal lOb-5 depended on the existence of a breach of fiduciary duties under state law).
47. Id.
48. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 1017; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1977); Continental Grain v. Pacific
Oilseeds Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
50. Cf IT, 519 F.2d at 1018. The Second Circuit also noted that, while its rule applies to
SEC or foreign individual plaintiff lawsuits, it might be different in class action contexts, cf
infra note 85 and accompanying text.
Vol. 16
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(a) securities of the same issuer are traded on a securities
market in the United States; or
(b) representations are made or negotiations are conducted in
the United States in regard to the transactions; or (c) the party
subject to the regulation is a United States national or resident, or
the persons sought to be protected are residents of the United
States,
The authority of the United States to exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe depends on its reasonableness in the light of evaluation
under § 403(2). 51
The fact that § 416(2) refers to the reasonableness test of § 403(2)
indicates that there are no fixed rules in this area and that the law
will develop on a case by case basis.
With regard to insider trading, questions of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe are generally not of primary concern.52 If the illegal trading
occurs on a U.S. exchange, U.S. securities laws apply regardless of
whether the insider is American or foreign and whether he acts di-
rectly or through the intermediary of an American or foreign bank.1
3
If the trading is done on a foreign stock exchange by a non-resident
of the United States, U.S. securities laws should not apply. 4 If the
investor is a U.S. resident, U.S. law might apply but the SEC usually
has, absent any international agreement, no power to obtain sufficient
evidence (jurisdiction to enforce).
51. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981) (emphasis added). See also FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1905 (Proposed Official
Draft 1980).; cf, Loss, Extraterritoriality in Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305
(1979).
52. The "extraterritorial" application of U.S. Securities laws has been discussed in a
number of articles: See e.g., Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International
Securities Transactions, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 890 (1981); Loomis & Grant, The US. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions Outside the U.S. and Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of the U.S. Securities Laws, I J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 3 (1978); Buethe &
Coyne, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Expanding
Application of the Conduct Test, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471 (1984); Hacker & Rotunda, The
Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign Business Under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV.
643 (1981); Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws: the Need
for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189 (1982); Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era of Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets: the Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 453 (1983); Note, Regulation of Offshore Investment Companies Through Extraterritorial
Application of Rule lOb-5, 1982 DUKE L.J. 167; Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking
Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant), I J. COMp. BUS. & CAP. MARKET
L. 39-48 (1978)).
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 416(l).
54. However, under §§ 416(2) and 403(2) of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, this result
does not necessarily follow.
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With regard to criminal provisions" different rules may govern
because the scope of criminal laws tends to be defined more strictly
on a territorial basis.
56
C Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
In order to render a valid, binding and enforceable judgment, a
court must have jurisdiction to adjudicate, for example, power to
bind the parties personally (in personam) or with regard to their
property (quasi in rem).5 7 Due process under the Fifth Amendment
as interpreted in International Shoe v. Washington and subsequent
case law,5" has two requirements. The defendant must have certain
minimum contacts with the forum and he must be given adequate
notice. The underlying rationale is fairness and reasonableness to the
parties.
1. Minimum Contacts. The Second Circuit held that Congress
intended SEA § 27 (and also SA § 22(a)) to extend personal jurisdic-
tion in federal securities law actions to the full reach permitted under
the due process clause.5 9 The provisions can therefore be character-
ized as a federal "long-arm statute."'  Thus, absent any of the well-
established bases of jurisdiction such as domicile, nationality, pres-
ence, consent or waiver," it "is essential that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State [for example, here, the
United States], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws. ' '62 Amplifying this classical statement, the Restatement (Sec-
55. S.E.A. § 32; S.A. § 24.
56. See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 38, at 854-94. See also Committee
on International Law of the New York Bar Association, The 1964 Amendments to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the Proposed Securities and Exchange Commission Rules-Inter-
national Law Aspects, 21 REC. A.B. Crrv N.Y. 240 (1966).
57. If the requirements of the U.S. law are met the judgment is enforceable everywhere in
the U.S. under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. A different ques-
tion, not discussed here, is whether it will be enforced in a foreign country. Generally this
requires at least that the U.S. court would also have been competent under the law of the
enforcing country. REESE AND ROSENBERG, supra note 46, at 315.
58. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); see also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
59. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
60. Note that S.E.A. § 27 and S.A. § 22(a) also serve as a basis for "subject matter juris-
diction" in the federal courts.
61. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 441(2); FED R. Civ. P. 12(b),(h).
62. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1340.
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ond) of Conflict of Laws names three types of factual connections,
each of which can serve as a basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction: Do-
ing business within the United States,63 doing an act within the
United States,"' or causing an effect in the United States by an act
done elsewhere.65
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (1971). For doing business it
may be sufficient that the defendant has an office in the U.S. although no contracts are con-
cluded there and the asserted claims are not related to the office's activities. See Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y. 2d 426, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (Ct. App. 1965). It is possible that
the Bryant rule is limited to suits by U.S. citizens or by the SEC. In the Bersch case doing
business was denied with regard to a Canadian defendant who had given up his New York
office prior to the fraudulent offering of IOS-shares in Canada (where he served as a principal
underwriter) and whose U.S.-directed activities at the time of the offering solely consisted of
the buying and selling of securities (other than 10S) on Canadian markets on behalf of Ameri-
cans. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998 (2d Cir. 1975).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 63, at § 36. A single
act done within the U.S. confers jurisdiction upon U.S. courts only if it is somehow connected
with the asserted claims. In Bersch for example, two breakfast meetings at the Carlyle Hotel in
New York between the Canadian defendant and the IOS's chief attorney who discussed prelim-
inarily the concept of IOS's going private, were not deemed sufficiently connected with the later
public offering. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 999. In SEC v. Gilbert, an insider
case, the purchase and sale of securities through New York broker-dealers by a Swiss bank
were sufficient to support jurisdiction over the bank in a suit alleging that these transactions
constituted a lOb-5 violation. SEC v. Gilbert [1979 Transfer-Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,914 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Even if a court denies personal jurisdiction in such a situation, it
still may assert quasi-in rem jurisdiction by attaching the bank's assets on United States broker-
age accounts. For the impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, on quasi-in rem jurisdiction
see Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal? 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.,
519 (1979); REESE AND ROSENBERG, supra note 46, at 157-159. A different question is,
whether in such a case the foreign bank's client, not a United States national or resident who
ordered the challenged transactions, can be brought before a U.S. court. The courts are likely
to assume jurisdiction either by considering the bank as an "agent" for jurisdictional purposes
or by invoking the effects theory, see e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533,
227 N.E.2d 851 (1967); cf REESE & ROSENBERG, supra note 46, at 128.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 63, at § 37. A classic illustration
for the effects theory is the example of a gun shot across the border. The theory must, espe-
cially in an international context, be applied with caution. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341; see also
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 1000. The remote possibility or mere foreseeabil-
ity that, for example, a misleading financial statement issued by a London accountant for a
London corporation might serve as a basis for reliance of U.S. investors purchasing the corpo-
ration's securities, is not enough. Leasco, 468 F.2d. at 1342. The criterium is rather whether
"the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum states are such that he should reason-
ably anticipate being haled into court there." World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. If, for
example, a foreign resident gives directly or indirectly to a New York broker a purchase or sale
order based on inside information, he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of trading on
the U.S. stock markets and knows or has good reason to know that his order will affect Ameri-
can investors. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); See SEC v. Gilbert, supra note 64. To
be sure, in each case a number of various factors such as the number of the victims in the
United States, the nationality or residence of the plaintiff, the SEC as opposed to a private
plaintiff or even the nature of the asserted claim must be considered and may tip the balance.
See Wagman v. Astle, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 94,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), where the court
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2. Adequate Notice. Adequate notice, to give the defendant an
opportunity to be heard, establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate, if min-
imum contacts exist. Service of process alone, even if effectuated per-
sonally upon the defendant within the United States, is not a
sufficient basis. "Transitory jurisdiction," for example, jurisdiction
solely by means of service on a foreign person in transit,66 is of doubt-
ful constitutional soundness.67
Sections SA 2(a) and SEA 27 are "statute[s] of the United
States" within Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and provide that process "may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found." This has two consequences.
First, process in federal securities law cases may be served nation-
wide6' and not just in the state where the district court sits.69 Sec-
ond, by using the word "wherever," Congress also authorized service
in foreign countries.70
The manner of service within the United States is described in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d), or (e) in connection with the relevant state stat-
ute.71 Service in foreign countries can also be made in the manner
described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i), for example, by "any form of mail
requiring a signed receipt."
72
A different question is, whether the manner of service described
by U.S. law is in conformity with the law of the country where ser-
vice is to be made. Absent any international treaty, service according
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(A),(B), (D) (as prescribed by the law of the
foreign country, pursuant to letters rogatory, by any form of mail
requiring a signed receipt) is probably least likely to provoke foreign
censure.73 However, some countries (for example Switzerland) are
indicates that in S.E.A. § 16(b) cases (automatic liability) stricter standards should govern than
in lOb-5 cases.
66. Cf Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). Jurisdiction was upheld
over a defendant who had been served with process while flying over Arkansas in a plane.
67. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 441(2)(a); but see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 28 (1971).
68. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
70. Leasco, 468 F.2d, at 1340.
71. Cf SEC v. Gilbert, supra note 64. The court holds that service in a different manner
than prescribed in the relevant statute is not sufficient even though the defendant was given
actual notice of the proceedings; cf Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); but see National
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
72. For service of subpoenas see infra text accompanying notes 85-114.
73. Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COL. L. REV.
1015,1041 (1965); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 1, 133, 134 (1964).
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opposed to any kind of service within their territory other than pur-
suant to letters rogatory.74 Though service by this method is very
time consuming, usually three to four months,"' it should be consid-
ered if the judgment has to be enforced in the foreign country.76
In "civil" cases service abroad can be made according to the
Hague Convention on Service Abroad of 1965"7 in a number of coun-
tries including France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Service pursuant to a "request" under Arts.
2-7 of the Convention takes about six weeks.78 Some States including
France, Japan and the United Kingdom also allow service directly by
mail.79 Service upon U.S. nationals may, in some countries, be made
directly by the U.S. consuls.8"
The Convention does not apply to "administrative" proceedings.
The question of whether certain proceedings should be characterized
as civil, administrative or penal is difficult to answer. The problems
can only be mentioned here, for example: according to which law
has the question to be decided; does a "civil" lawsuit initiated by an
administrative agency such as the SEC fall under the Convention;
should the label given to a certain remedy (for example "civil pen-
alty" under SEA § 21(d)(2)) decide?
3. Forum non conveniens. The doctrine of forum non conven-
ience is a device to restrict access to U.S. courts even though jurisdic-
tion would exist, because other competent fora seem to be more
convenient. United States courts are rather willing to dismiss an ac-
tion on grounds of forum non conveniens where the plaintiff is a for-
eigner.8 In Leasco, where the plaintiff was an American citizen, the
court first noted that "the balance of convenience would favor a trial
in England" and then went on to say that "courts should require
positive evidence of unusually extreme cirmumstances, and should be
thoroughly convinced that material unjustice is manifest before exer-
cising any such discretion to deny a citizen access to the courts of
74. Mann, supra note 73, at 134.
75. Telephone interview with M. White, Attorney Adviser, U.S. Department of State (Bu-
reau of Consular Affairs), (1984).
76. Cf. Smit, supra note 73, at 1040-42.
77. Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. 6638.
78. White, supra note 75.
79. Hague Convention, supra note 77, at art. 10(a); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(I)(D)
80. Hague Convention, supra note 77, at art. 8.
81. But cf Piper Aircraft Co. v. Gaynell Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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this country. ' s2
4. Class actions. The availability of a class action 83 can be de-
cisive for an effective enforcement of securities laws through private
suits, especially in cases where a great number of relatively small in-
vestors are concerned. If on the other hand, as in Bersch, only few
American and a large number of foreign investors are defrauded,
courts will rather not permit a class action. 4 The tail within the U.S.
is too small to wag such a big foreign dog. This shows that an exten-
sive extraterritorial application of the securities laws, as in Bersch,
and a generous attitude with regard to personal jurisdiction do not
necessarily make private actions an effective means of enforcement.
D. Enforcement Jurisdiction (Orders Compelling the Production of
Documents Located Abroad)
Orders compelling the production of evidence can be issued by
courts (in criminal cases by grand juries) and by the SEC .88 How-
ever, court and agency orders have different statutory bases and will
therefore be treated separately. 6 The basic problems of jurisdiction
are the same. An agency, like a court, must have the power to deal
with and investigate a certain case. There must be personal jurisdic-
tion over the target of the investigation (minimum contacts) 8 7 plus
proper service. Finally, the discovery order must be based on a valid
legal authority: These questions revolve around whether the United
States can prescribe a certain behavior outside its territory. More
exactly; to what extent can United States courts and agencies compel
the production of documents or the taking of depositions in a foreign
country, through sanctions imposed within the United States. 8 This
82. Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922
(1955); Leasco, 468 F.2d, at 1344.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
84. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d, at 993-98.
85. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
86. See S.E.A. §§ 21(b), (c); S.A. §§ 19(b), 22(b). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 17; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1784 (1982).
87. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1321 n. 119
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
We assume that just as a court may not validly exert its adjudicative authority over a
defendant lacking 'minimum contacts' with the forum, . . . the FTC is subject to
some limitations on its personal jurisdiction-set by the due process clause of the
Constitution-which bar it from exercising its investigative authority over a foreigner
lacking any contact with the United States.
88. It is obvious that a State cannot exercise coercion by acts done within the territory of a
foreign State without that State's permission. See Mann, supra note 73, at 131.
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kind of jurisdiction, usually referred to as enforcement jurisdiction,89
"by and large continues to be strictly territorial."'  It is often nar-
rower than jurisdiction to prescribe, as discussed with regard to the
extraterritorial reach of United States law. 9 It is important to note
that even if a United States district court or the SEC has personal
jurisdiction over parties or witnesses and the securities laws apply,
United States discovery law92 does not necessarily apply to evidence
abroad in the same manner that it would in pure domestic cases.9 3
1. SEC Subpoenas. The cases discussed concern situations,
where someone refuses to comply with an agency subpoena and the
agency then invokes the aid of a court. This procedure, as prescribed
in SEA § 21(c) and similar statutes, is consistent with the require-
ment of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law
(Tent.Draft No. 3, 1982), § 420, that an order to produce documents
abroad be issued by a court and not merely an agency.
In SEC v. Minas de Artemisa,94 an American citizen, K, was the
president of and had control over both an Arizona corporation and
its wholly owned Mexican subsidiary. While investigating whether
these corporations and K had violated securities laws by selling stock
to investors in the United States, the SEC served subpoenas for the
production of documents. The subpoenas were directed to both cor-
porations and K personally at his Arizona residence.95 To enforce
the subpoenas the SEC applied for a court order under SA § 22(b).
Notice of the proceedings was again served on K at home. K moved
for dismssal for lack of jurisdiction because part of the documents
were located in Mexico and Mexican law would prohibit their re-
moval. The Court first pointed out that it could require persons
within its jurisdiction to produce documents located in a foreign
country,9 6 provided that the foreign law would not thereby be vio-
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 6-7 (1965); Saint-
Gobain, 639 F.2d at 1315, 1316. Cf supra note 30 and accompanying text.
90. Saint-Gobain 639 F.2d at 1316.
91. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
93. Matter of Marc Rich & Co., AG, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983) is therefore misleading: "The question, then, . . . is whether the district court had such
personal jurisdiction ...that it could enforce obedience to the grand jury subpoena." Id. at
667 (emphasis added). Cf Mann, supra note 73, at 146.
94. 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
95. For details on the manner of service of an SEC subpoena see the Commission's Rules
of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.8, 201.-14(b)(3)(1984).
96. S.A. § 22(a) and S.E.A. § 21(c) provide that process may be served "wherever defend-
ant may be found."
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lated.97 The court then decided that SA § 22(b) doesn't limit the
court's power with regard to the enforcement of a SEC subpoena9"
provided only that service of the subpoena is made within the United
States.99
Federal Maritime Commission v. DeSmedt,' o a case concerning
section 27 of the Shipping Act of 1916,'0' which-like SEA
§ 21(b)--authorizes the F.M.C. to subpoena documents "from any
place within the United States," was similarly decided. 10 2 Judge
Friendly stressed the importance of the question for all the federal
agencies that have to regulate foreign commerce.'0°
The broad reading of statutes like SEA § 21 (b), although clearly
inconsistent with the "plain meaning" of the statutory language,
seems to be reconcilable with the standards of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe." This is true given the defendants' intensive contacts with
the United States including residence, stock sale and effects on Amer-
ican markets, business conducted in the U.S., and effects of shipping
rates agreement on U.S. foreign trade. If the contacts with the
United States are attenuated the result might be different.
In SEC v. Zanganeh °5 the D.C. District Court denied the en-
forcement of a subpoena issued to a nonresident foreigner to appear
as a nonparty witness from France. Service was made at the offices
of an Oklahoma corporation owned by the foreigner. The court did
not decide whether different considerations might apply in the
case of a United States citizen or an alien, who. . . had in some
fashion submitted to the SEC's jurisdiction. This is also not a case
where the SEC requests foreign-located property of a company re-
siding or doing business within the United States.1i6
97. The question of foreign law was not decisive because Mexican law only prohibited the
removal, not the inspection or copying of the documents. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d at 218.
98. The provision provides in relevant part that "such attendance of witnesses and the
production of any such records may be required from any place in the United States or any
State at any designated place of hearing." S.A. § 22(b) (emphasis added). S.E.A. § 21(b) is
identical.
99. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d at 216; for material concerning the question of service see
infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
100. 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
101. 46 U.S.C. § 826.
102. 366 F.2d at 472. For other aspects of the case see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra
note 38, at 1077-85.
103. He named especially the SEC, Federal Communications Commission and the Civil
Aeronautics Board; see CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
104. But see Moore J., dissenting opinion in De Smedt, supra note 100.
105. 470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.C.D. 1978).
106. Id. (citing Minas de Artemisa and DeSmedt).
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If the issue is the validity of service abroad of a SEC subpoena,
the courts tend to take a more narrow view of statutory reading. In
FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain Judge Wilkey, confronted with
restraints of international law, refused to recognize the agency's au-
thority to serve its subpoenas abroad unless the statute expresses a
clear congressional intent.'° 7 In the light of these decisions it be-
comes apparent why the SEC has, by means of its "waiver by con-
duct" concept, tried to create, among other things, a basis for the
service of SEC subpoenas in the United States.'
0 8
2. Court Subpoenas. Court subpoenas can be served in a for-
eign country, but only to party or non-party witnesses who are na-
tionals or residents of the United States.' °9 Against party witnesses
the procedural sanctions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) usually make the
use of subpoenas impossible because the evidence can be obtained in
an "other manner.""10
The problems, which can arise in connection with the service of
subpoenas abroad can only be mentioned here. One of them is the
uncertainty with regard to the word resident."' Another problem is
the manner of service. According to Section 1783, all the modes de-
scribed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) are available. The other question is
whether foreign law would be violated." 2 Most states observe the
traditional view in international law which makes a distinction be-
tween service containing mere notification (non-compulsory) and ser-
vice comprising a command (compulsory).' 13 It can even be argued
that a subpoena is criminal in nature." I4 In that case the Hague Con-
vention of the Service Abroad in "Civil or Commercial Matters"
would be inapplicable a priori. If it applies, a state might still refuse
to transmit the subpoena under article 13 on the grounds of infringe-
ment upon its sovereignty. Without further examination of these
107. Saint-Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1324. The new section 20(c)(6)(B) of the FTC Act, as
amended in 1980, could allow a different result. It gives the FTC authority to serve its civil
investigative demands abroad in a manner described in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). See also Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm. v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
108. See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783-84. See generally Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COL. L. REv. 1015, 1035-40 (1965); Smit, Interna-
tional Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COL. L. REV. 1031, 1044-48 (1961).
110. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a).
I 1l. Reese and Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence", 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953).
112. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
113. See Mann, supra note 73, at 132-37.
114. See Smit, supra note 73, at 1048; cf Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440
(1931) (jurisdiction sui generis).
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questions, there appear to exist considerable difficulties, if a court
subpoena has to be served abroad.
III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN
DOMESTIC LAW ON ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION
A. Territoriality and Extraterritoriality.
Territory and nationality continue to be recognized as important
principles of international law. The famous decision of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the case of the S.S. "Lotus"
contains this classical statement:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by interna-
tional law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permis-
sive rule-it may not exercise its power in any form in the
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory
except by virture of a permissive rule derived from international
custom or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a
State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of
any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and
in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international
law. . . .Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect
that States may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
1 5
With the internationalization of many markets, questions of ter-
ritorial limitations have been replaced more by policy questions. A
State that adopted a strong policy in favor of a "clean" market "envi-
ronment" strives to enforce this policy also against those who cause
"pollution" from outside the State. Well-known examples are the
antitrust laws of the United States, the European Community and
the Federal Republic of Germany. Another is the enforcement of
United States securities laws. "In its efforts to protect the United
States securities market, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission has from time to time tested the limits of principles of
territoriality and nationality, causing annoyance and provoking re-
115. The case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser A, No. 10, at 18-19
(Judgment of Sept. 7).
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sentment abroad."' 6 The success of such efforts depends to a large
extent on the possibility of obtaining evidence, especially documents,
from foreign countries.
B. Secrecy Laws and Blocking Statutes
1. Secrecy Laws. Secrecy laws appear mainly in the banking
and financial area. Their purpose is to protect the interest of the
financial institution's clients in having transactions kept confidential.
One of the most frequently cited examples is the Swiss bank secrecy
law. However, most developed nations recognize some form of bank-
ing secrecy. In the Federal Republic of Germany it is based on the
contract between bank and client, even if not expressly stipulated."'
The underlying rationale is the constitutional right to privacy.1t t
Thus, German banking secrecy is not a mere contractual device but
reflects a public policy.
The peculiarity of Swiss law is not the existence of banking se-
crecy, but its protection by criminal law. Article 47 of the Federal
Banking Law provides that anyone who knowingly violates or in-
duces others to violate banking secrecy is liable to a fine of up to Sfr.
50,000 or imprisonment up to six months. 1 9 Swiss banking secrecy
is not unlimited. It may be lifted if the client expressly authorizes the
bank to disclose information or if the bank can execute the client's
order only by revealing a fact protected by Article 47.120 For exam-
ple, if the client orders its bank to transfer money to a creditor, he
impliedly consents to the disclosure of his bank relationship to the
named person. The situation is different with regard to non-routine
116. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, Introductory Note to § 401.
117. As early as 1914, the German Reichsgericht stated: "There cannot be any doubt that
the banker has a secrecy obligation towards his client. . . . The banker has a special relation-
ship of confidence with his client, and their business contacts relate to matters of the client
which he, rightly, does not permit to be disclosed to third parties not involved therein." Juris-
tische Wochenschrift 830 (1914).
118. See Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, supra note 7, at 419. The secrecy rights can, of
course, be waived and cannot be invoked against requests for information by competent author-
ities in criminal and tax proceedings.
119. See H. SCHULTZ, BANKING SECRECY AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS 8 (1983).
120. Id. at 10. For a detailed discussion of the scope of Swiss Bank Secrecy see Meyer,
Swiss Banking Secrecy and its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV.
18 (1978); Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and of the United States-
Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 1-13 (1983); Aubert,
The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2 INT'L TAX &
BUS. LAW. 273 (1984).
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banking matters.12' If, for example, a client gives his bank an order
to purchase or sell securities on United States markets, the mere giv-
ing of the order would most likely not be recognized as an implied
waiver by Swiss courts.' 2 2 A further limitation exists since Swiss
banks are obliged to disclose information to the competent authori-
ties in criminal proceedings, regardless of whether they are con-
ducted against a client or a third party.' 23 The Swiss example,
banking secrecy protected by criminal law, has been followed by a
number of other States. 24
2. Blocking Statutes. Blocking statutes are enacted to protect a
State's interests. Unlike secrecy laws blocking statutes cannot be dis-
posed of by private parties because their protection is not the primary
purpose of a blocking statute. The enactment of blocking laws usu-
ally has occurred in response to major United States discovery pro-
ceedings accompanied by a wave of court orders for the production
of foreign documents. 125 Foreign non-disclosure statutes have been
of two types: the first, providing that a government official may, in
his discretion, prohibit the production of a class of documents;' 26 the
second type, prohibits production of any documents requested by a
foreign authority unless the documents are of a type normally sent
out of the country in the regular course of business. 127
121. Cf. H. SCHULTZ, BANKING SECRECY AND THE SWISS-AMERICAN TREATY ON
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 9 (1976).
122. To secure their ability to comply with the Suiss-American Memorandum of Under-
standing Swiss banks sent a prepared declaration to their clients. By signing the document, the
client refused to subject himself to the MOU, and the bank, as a consequence, would not con-
tinue to execute further transactions for this client on U.S. stock markets. If a client did not
send the signed statement back, further orders where considered by the bank as an implied
waiver to the extent that disclosure might be required under the MOU. See infra notes 285-96
and accompanying text.
123. See H. SCHULTZ, supra note 119, at 8. There are, however, limitations of the duty to
cooperate in criminal proceedings in two cantons (Neuchatel and Vaud), and general limita-
tions in the tax area. Id.
124. See Staff Study of the Crime and Secrecy, 98th Cong. S. Prot. 98-21, 177-253 (1983).
125. Cf Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 639 F.2d at 1325, 1326. See also the survey in RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 51, at § 420, Reporters Notes 3, 4.
126. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: British Protection of Trading Interests
Act. 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Cf Lowenfeld, Sovereignty. Jurisdiction, and Reason-
ableness: A Reply to A. V Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1981).
127. An example is the French legislation enacted as a reaction to investigation of the FTC
directed toward the French Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, French Law No. 80-538, 1980, J.O.
English translation in Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, supra note 87, 146-47.
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C. Case Analysis
1. Introduction. As indicated, there are a few generally ac-
cepted rules of international law in the area of foreign discovery.,28
Nevertheless, in the author's view it is highly desirable that courts
resolve conflicts of jurisdiction in this area using something other
than a vague balancing of interests test. Balancing approaches al-
most inevitably favor the policies and interests of the requesting
State. The United States case law relating to choice of law questions
or to jurisdiction to adjudicate is ample evidence of this tendency.
Notwithstanding some singular "victories" by requesting States, in
the long run this leads to more and more retaliatory measures by
other states; the example of blocking legislation has already been de-
scribed. An unsensible enforcement policy will impede rather than
promote international judicial cooperation, which without doubt is
strongly needed today. The following case analysis will therefore fo-
cus primarily on the question of whether it is possible to deduce crite-
ria of international law which would allow the use of objective
standards without recourse to balancing of interests tests to decide a
number of cases.
2. Parties and Witnesses. A clear distinction should be made
at the outset between party witnesses (parties) and non-party wit-
nesses (witnesses). Discovery law recognizes the distinction by limit-
ing discovery and affording greater protection to witnesses.
However, it is not absolutely clear who should be considered a party
and who a witness. If the proceedings involve the United States
branch of a foreign company, this company is a party. If, however,
the foreign company acts within the United States through a subsidi-
ary, it is not necessarily a party. Yet, the existence of total ownership
and control might require a different view (piercing the corporate
veil). Even if, despite total ownership, the subsidiary in fact acts to-
tally independently, the SEC or a private plaintiff may nevertheless
name the foreign parent company as a party (defendant) by alleging
the subsidiary's dependency. Furthermore, a foreign bank which
trades on United States stock markets on behalf of its clients and
holds the proceeds of presumably illegal insider trading on a broker-
age account, can easily be made a nominal party in an injunctive
proceeding. As a consequence, the full range of discovery power 129
128. Supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. §§ 26-37.
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is available whether the bank is innocent or indeed involved in the
illegal transactions." 0 While with regard to service the distinction
between parties and witnesses has to be made formally,' substance
over form should govern with regard to the validity of discovery
orders.
3. Requests Directed to Parties.
(a) The first form is where the enforcing State proceeds against
the local branch of a foreign company with a view to the production
of documents located in the foreign country. The 52nd Conference
of the International Law Association (ILA), held in Helsinki in 1966,
the same year the DeSmedt case was decided, 32 issued the following
statement:
Where a State requires a local branch to produce documents relat-
ing to its own affairs, the demand cannot be resisted merely be-
cause the documents are not within the jurisdiction or that they
belong to a non-resident alien. A case may arise when the discov-
ery is prohibited by his lex situs. In such a case, each State is
acting within its jurisdiction, the one in requiring production and
the other in forbidding it, and a conflict arises.
1 3 3
A typical case standing for this proposition was decided by the Ger-
man Supreme Finance Court.' 3" A Swiss industrial firm had a
branch in Germany which, with respect to its own profits, was liable
to taxation in Germany. The books relating to its affairs were kept in
Switzerland and therefore subject to the Swiss business secrecy laws
(art. 273 of the Swiss Penal Code). The Court held that insofar as
the books were related to the German branch's affairs, they had to be
produced in Germany. 
31
(b) A similar approach should be applied with regard to a
United States subsidiary, if it can be considered a mere "agent" or
"alter ego" of a foreign parent company. Typical indices of such a
relationship are 100% stock ownership or interlocking directors.
36
If the domestic subsidiary, despite the legal separation, functions in
130. Cf. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (1982).
131. See supra, notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
132. Supra note 100.
133. Report of the 52nd Conference, International Law Association 112 (Helsinki 1966)
(emphasis added). See also Mann, supra note 73, at 156.
134. Judgement of Sept. 27, 1933, Supreme Finance Court, Ger., Reichssteuerblatt 1188
(1933).
135. Id.
136. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COL. L. REV. 343 (1947). See also
OECD Survey, The Responsibility of Parent Companies for Their Subsidiaries 29-31 (1980).
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practice like a branch of the foreign parent, it can be treated as such
for purposes of enforcement jurisdiction. The parent, on the other
hand, has the status of a "party," rather than of a "third party
witness."
In United States v. Toyota Motor Corp. " Toyota USA and
Toyota Japan were both targets of an IRS investigation. Toyota
USA, the exclusive importer of Toyota cars, was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Toyota Japan and, although Toyota USA was operated
as a distinct corporate entity, with its own books, records, bank ac-
counts, tax returns, financial statements and accounting procedures,
there was a significant overlap between the senior management and
board of directors of the parent and the subsidiary.' 38 The IRS al-
leged that Toyota Japan had charged artificially high sales prices to
Toyota USA, thus reducing the subsidiary's profits and its United
States tax liability. In order to make adjustments permitted under
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,' 39 the IRS wanted to com-
pare the sales price paid by Toyota USA with that which Toyota
Japan charged to domestic Japanese dealers. After the Japanese
Government refused to voluntarily provide the information under
the U.S.-Japanese Tax Treaty,'" the IRS served Toyota USA with
summons issued both to the subsidiary and the Japanese parent.' 4
After holding that it had personal jurisdiction over Toyota Japan,
4 2
the court applied § 420 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
(Revised) (Tent. Draft. No. 3, 1982) and enforced the summons.' 43
Under the approach favored here, the real question is whether
the documents containing information about the sales prices to Japa-
nese dealers concerned the parent's or subsidiary's U.S.-related ac-
tivities.' " The answer should be "no" since Toyota Japan's domestic
car sales have nothing to do with its car exports to the U.S. market.
The U.S.-Japanese tax treaty alone provides for a way to get the in-
137. 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983) and 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
138. Toyota, 569 F. Supp. at 356.
139. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
140. See generally, The Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 8, 1971, United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 969,
T.I.A.S. No. 7365.
141. For details of service see Toyota, 569 F. Supp. at 1160; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7602.
142. Toyota, 561 F. Supp. at 354.
143. Toyota, 569 F. Supp. at 1158. See 26 U.S.C. § 7604.
144. This question concerns enforcement jurisdiction. A different issue is whether, forpur-
poses of personal jurisdiction over Toyota Japan, the alleged tax claims arise out of its forum-
related activities; the court is right in assuming so. "The forum-related activity is the sale of
Toyota Japan's products to U.S. consumers by Toyota U.S.A." Toyota, 561 F. Supp. at 360.
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formation. If Japan (allegedly) does not comply with its obligations
under the treaty, the conflict should rather be resolved by govern-
mental instead of court action.'
45
The situation in the Marc Rich case appears to be different.
46
Marc Rich, an American resident, together with other individuals
(one U.S. and three Swiss residents) owned and controlled a Swiss
corporation and its wholly-owned New York subsidiary. During an
investigation of an alleged tax evasion scheme involving both the sub-
sidiary and the individuals, a grand jury issued a subpoena which was
served on the subsidiary and directed to the Swiss parent. The re-
quest was for the production of documents located in Switzerland.
Though the structure of Marc Rich is similar to that in the Toyota
case the cases can be clearly distinguished. In Marc Rich, the re-
quested documents were related with an alleged criminal conduct of
two U.S. residents within the U.S.'47 True, the criminal liability was
not yet established, but the court cautiously limited its holding by
concluding "that, in a case such as this, if the Government shows that
there is a reasonable probability that ultimately it will succeed in es-
tablishing the facts necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, compli-
ance with the grand jury's subpoena may be directed."' 48
Furthermore, while nobody would expect Toyota USA to keep docu-
ments concerning its parent's domestic sales in the Japanese market,
this would not be true with respect to transactions between the par-
ent and the subsidiary. In other words, United States courts can and
should generously enforce discovery orders, where records have been
removed from their "proper" situs. Which situs should be consid-
ered a "proper" one depends, again, on whether the documents con-
cern U.S.-related activities, and physical presence is not decisive.' 49
145. Another possibility would be a tax statute authorizing the IRS in dubious cases to
estimate a subsidiary's profits on the basis of profits or capital returns of comparable enter-
prises. Thus the burden of proof of actually lower profits would shift.
146. Matter of Marc Rich & Co. AG, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983).
147. Cf. Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 999, 1021 (1984).
148. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 670 (emphasis added). Affidavits submitted by the govern-
ment disclosed that in 1980 approximately 40% of the U.S. subsidiary's crude oil purchases,
worth $345 million, were from the Swiss parent. The subsidiary then realized a gross loss of
over $110 million in selling to its domestic customers. "There is sufficient likelihood that un-
lawful tax manipulation was taking place between the Swiss parent and its New York subsidi-
ary." Id.
149. Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 126, at 629, pointing out that rigid rules based on factors
such as the location of documents "bear no relation to reality" in a time where parties are
connected by telex and Xerox machines.
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(c) The enforcing State proceeds against a local company with
regard to documents located at the company's foreign subsidiary or
branch.
The mere fact that the United States company may have "cus-
tody or control" over the requested documents should not justify
every demand. Although, this is precisely the decisive question
under present United States law, aside from considerations of comity.
Since the control test focuses primarily on the factual power of the
parent to elect the subsidiary's officers,15° the question whether the
documents concern U.S.-related activities becomes irrelevant. On
the other hand, in cases where documents have been seized by a for-
eign government to prevent disclosure, a simple control test would
necessarily have to lead to the demand of the request, since it can
hardly be argued that "control" exists in such a situation."' There-
fore, neither should "control" alone be enough, nor should lack of
"control" necessarily be an impeachment to the use of a court's sub-
poena power. Certainly, these questions have to be considered on the
comity level. '
5 2
On a first level, the test should be whether the documents con-
cern U.S.-related activities or whether the United States can be con-
sidered, for purposes of the discovery order, as the documents'
"proper" situs. Thus, under this test, SEC v. Minas de Artemisa'"
was properly decided. Another example is United States v. Vetco
Inc. " A United States manufacturing corporation was suspected of
fraudulently avoiding taxation of the income of its Swiss subsidiary
by using two unrelated Swiss companies as nominal conduits for its
merchandise shipped to and sold by the Swiss subsidiary. The IRS
issued a summons to the U.S. corporation and its accountant. The
court enforced the summons. Applying the balancing approach set
forth in section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law, it noted that any hardship caused by the enforcement could
150. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-45 (1979): if a cor-
poration has power, either directly or indirectly, to elect a majority of the directors of another
corporation, such corporation may be deemed in control of the corporation whose directors it
has the power to elect to office. See also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2210 (Suppl. 1985).
151. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (a)(1); See also J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, § 15.05 (2d ed. 1981), with further references; Note, Enforcing
Discovery of Documents under Federal Rule 34: The Effect of Foreign Law on the Concept of
Control, 62 Yale L. J. 1248 (1953).
152. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
153. Supra note 94.
154. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
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have been avoided, if the defendants had kept records of the Swiss
subsidiary in the United States as required by section 964(c) Internal
Revenue Code.' The documents relating to transactions between
the United States parent and foreign subsidiary, thus their "proper"
situs being the United States, 56 the court decided correctly on the
first level (international law). The next question then was, although
not dealt with separately by the court, whether an IRS summons
could overcome the Swiss business secrecy law. 1
57
(d) With regard to mere procedural sanctions limited to a
party's stake in the litigation' 58 as opposed to additional contempt
sanctions, 59 the ILA Report" enunciates the following statement:
Where a non-resident alien fails to comply with a discovery order
properly made, there is nothing in international law that would
preclude the court from making inferences against him in accord-
ance with its own law of evidence; or from dismissing the claim or
striking out the defense, as the case may be.
The practicability of such sanctions, which can be less oppressive
than a contempt sanction, should always be tested first. However,
they obviously do not apply with regard to a third party witness
without a direct economic stake in the outcome of the case. Yet, if
an innocent third party has been made a "nominal" defendant, a less
oppressive procedural sanction should, if practicable, be preferred to
a contempt sanction. 161
4. Requests Directed to Witnesses. 162 The older case law has
been more restrictive in enforcing subpoenas against foreign wit-
nesses. In Ings v. Ferguson163 two subpoenas had been served upon
New York branches of two Canadian banks, Bank of Nova Scotia
(BNS) and Toronto Dominion (TD). One subpoena requested the
production of documents located at the BNS head-office in Canada.
155. Id. at 1332.
156. The mere fact that a statute prescribes the making and keeping of certain documents
within the U.S., does not necessarily mean that the U.S. is the "proper" situs. The statute must
be reasonable insofar as it may only require the making of documents which concern U.S.-
related activities. In short, the existence of a statute can be invoked as a rebuttable presump-
tion for the required relation. Cf I.R.C. § 964 (1982).
157. COD. PEN. art. 273. For the Swiss banking secrecy laws see supra notes 119-24 and
accompanying text. See also infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(C).
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
160. ILA Report, supra note 133, at 112. See also Mann, supra note 73, at 157.
161. Cf infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
162. For the difficulties with the distinction, see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
163. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
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The documents related to a transfer of $100,000 from Chase Manhat-
tan New York to BNS Montreal and the disbursement of the money.
The second subpoena concerned documents in Canada which re-
ported a transfer from the Havanna branch of the Royal Bank of
Canada to the TD branch in Montreal. After noting that under Ca-
nadian law, "it would appear possible to secure both the testimony of
witnesses and the production of the desired documents,"'' the Sec-
ond Circuit continued:
Subpoena power is not absolute. Even if exercised within proper
territorial limits, the subpoena may be scrutinized by the courts.
Every reason exists for careful scrutiny here. No claim is being
made against either bank by any litigant. At most the bank is being
called as a witness. The transactions did not originate in the New
York Agencies. And the records sought are in the custody of
branches in Canada. Under these circumstances it seems highly
undesirable that the courts of the United States should counte-
nance service of a subpoena upon a New York agency of a foreign
bank which is not a party to the litigation and whose country has
provided procedures for securing information, the production of
which is consistent with its laws.
165
The Second Circuit did not follow this line in United States v. First
National City Bank. 66 There a federal grand jury investigating a
world-wide quinine cartel had issued a subpoena to a New York bank
requiring production of documents relating to transactions of its cus-
tomers located both at its head office in New York and at its branch
in Frankfurt, West Germany. Citibank complied with the subpoena
with respect to the documents located in New York, but refused to
comply with respect to the documents located in Frankfurt. Ci-
tibank argued that compliance would subject it to civil liability for
breach of its client's contractual right to confidentiality. 67 The court
nevertheless enforced the subpoena after balancing the importance of
antitrust enforcement to the United State against the German bank
secrecy. Under the Ferguson language the outcome would probably
have been different. Yet, the custody or control argument, rejected
and not available in Ferguson, may have influenced the court's
reasoning. 
61
164. Id. at 151.
165. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). The decision was written by J. Moore, who in the
DeSmedt case wrote the dissent, supra notes 100, 104.
166. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
167. Cf supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. The Court's decision is consistent
with First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert denied, 361 U.S. 948
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Recent cases indicate that the control or custody argument is
not decisive. In United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia169 the situation
was similar to that in Ferguson. A federal grand jury, conducting a
tax and narcotics investigation, issued a subpoena duces tecum to
BNS Canada and served it at the BNS Miami branch. The order
called for the production of certain documents maintained, inter alia,
at the bank's branch offices in Nassau, Bahamas, and relating to the
bank accounts of a customer, a United States citizen.' 7° The court
was not convinced by BNS's argument that it was a "mere stake-
holder," for example, a third party witness. The court enforced the
subpoena, finally granting a fine of $25,000 for each day of non-com-
pliance. As a result, BNS produced the requested documents.' 7 '
The court's reasoning, based heavily on United States v. Field,'72 is
another example of the prevailing confusion with regard to the vari-
ous kinds of jurisdiction.' 73 In Field the only real issue was whether
a U.S. court could obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
alien who is only temporarily in the United States.' Once the court
has personal jurisdiction, it has, even under the most rigid territorial
test, also the power to compel a present witness to testify (jurisdiction
to enforce). To this extent no question of international law is in-
volved. 7 ' Despite the court's unsatisfactory argumentation, the re-
sult in Bank of Nova Scotia can be justified if the documents were
related to the activities of the Miami branch. More precisely, if the
Miami branch handled all banking transactions for accounts held at
the Bahamian branches, this would give its United States clients the
unique opportunity of having a Bahamian bank account subject to
Bahamian bank secrecy laws'76 "within" their Miami bank.'77 If this
(1960), decided prior to Ferguson and concerning service of a subpoena at National City's main
office in New York requesting the production of records located at a Panama branch; the court
there ordered enforcement on the condition that the law of Panama was not violated.
169. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S.Ct. 3086 (1983).
170. Id. at 1390.
171. See Olsen, supra note 147, at 1014.
172. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). A grand jury was investi-
gating the use of foreign banks in evading tax enforcement. Field, a nonresident alien, officer of
a bank at the Great Cayman Islands, was, while temporarily in the U.S., subpoenaed to testify
about matters concerning his bank and its clients. Upon Field's refusal to testify, the court
imposed a contempt penalty despite the witness' assertion that the very fact of testifying would
subject him to criminal penalties in his country.
173. See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text regarding transient jurisdiction.
175. Whether Field was protected under the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth
Amendment is a question of pure U.S. constitutional law.
176. Field, 532 F.2d at 405 n.2.
177. The decision in fact indicates such a constellation. 691 F.2d at 1387. However, the
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was indeed the case, the proper situs of the documents was Miami,
not Nassau. The sole fact that they are not physically kept at the
Miami branch is no valid defense. 7 ' If, on the other hand, the sole
function of the Miami branch with regard to the Bahamian accounts
was to transfer money of its U.S. clients to Nassau,' 79 it could be
compelled to produce the records relating to those transactions.
A recent case in the area of securities law enforcement is SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italian ("St. Joe Case").8 ° Immediately prior
to the announcement of a cash tender offer for all the common stock
of the St. Joe Minerals Corporation for $45 per share (pre-tender
offer market price about $30 per share), a Swiss bank (BSI)
purchased large amounts of St. Joe stock. The transactions resulted
in overnight profits of almost $2 million. The SEC investigated the
case and brought a civil suit against BSI and "certain unknown pur-
chasers," alleging violation of the insider laws. A temporary re-
straining order was issued freezing the proceeds of the transactions
which were held on a New York brokerage account. BSI declined to
comply with the SEC's requests for production of documents. A sub-
poena was served upon BSI's New York subsidiary which was not
involved in the transactions. The court granted the SEC's motion
and ordered the bank to either disclose its customer's identity or risk
substantial sanctions, including fines of $50,000 per day of non-com-
pliance and a ban on trading in the United States markets.'
Judge Pollack, after noting that the Second Circuit "has clearly
moved to a more flexible position"' 82 than it took, for example, in the
Ferguson case, based his decision primarily on the good faith test
enunciated in Societd Internationale v. Rogers."8 3 After weighing the
factors described in section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law, he concluded:
It would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to
invade American markets, violate American laws if they were in-
deed violated [sic], withdraw profits and resist accountability for
itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonym-
Court did not refer to this factual background in the decision; under the author's view, these
factual questions would be decisive for determining the validity and the scope of the subpoenas
and would therefore have to be presented to the jury. Cf. also Olsen, supra note 147, at 1022.
178. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
179. The bank admitted that the Miami agency is a one-way conduit for customer commu-
nication with the Nassau branch. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384.
180. 92 F.R.D. Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
181. Id.; Request for Comments, supra note 2.
182. Banca Della Svizzera, 92 F.R.D. at 115.
183. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
31
Moessle: The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforcement i
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ity under foreign law.I"4
Sweeping language usually indicates a lack of legal arguments. How-
ever there is no doubt that the requested documents concerned
United States related activities. There is no doubt that under the
principle stated above regarding requests directed to parties and
notwithstanding the possible existence of countervailing comity con-
siderations, disclosure could be requested even if it violated Swiss
law. The test on the first level (international law) is passed. The real
issue, as indicated in the quoted passage of the judgment, is whether
a witness, absent any proof of his knowing participation in an illegal
transaction, can, under the Constitution s5 and comity considera-
tions be exposed to such draconic sanctions. Under the Societd Inter-
nationale"8 6 rationale it might have been more appropriate to
threaten BSI with procedural sanctions, once it had been made a for-
mal party187 , rather than with contempt penalties. 188  BSI's risk
would therefore have been limited to its interest in the proceeds of
the trading, if it indeed had such an interest.
D. Conclusion
1. The Need for Objective Standards. The case analysis has
demonstrated that the application of a mere balancing of interests test
provides for litigation certainty only insofar as the interests of the
enforcing State usually prevail. A typical example of this not very
surprising finding is the following passage from the Toyota opinion:
Section 420(l)(c) [Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982)] also mandates consideration of. . . the
extent to which compliance would undermine important Japanese
interests. . . . [D]isclosure of Toyota Japan's financial records
might undermine the national interests of the Government of Ja-
pan. Although Japan does not have a 'blocking' statute prohibit-
ing disclosure of the information requested here, its Government
has taken the position that, in this case, compelling the production
184. 92 F.R.D. at 119 (emphasis added).
185. Constitutional limits have rarely been addressed directly in the context of enforcement
jurisdiction. But see Note, Enforcing Discovery of Documents under Federal Rule 34: The
Effect of Foreign Law on the Concept of Control, 62 YALE L.J. 1248, 1254 nn.32,36,37 (1953).
186. See supra note 183.
187. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
188. It must be noted that in Societd Internationale the Supreme Court took a rather mod-
erate position, although tlhe Swiss company had appeared as a plaintiff in the U.S. courts; a
situation in which it is much more reasonable to subject the party to all the discovery rules. See
also the critical analysis in Note, Conflict of Law-Discovery--Swiss Banks Can Be Compelled
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of documents located in Japan would violate international law.
With all due respect to Government of Japan's position, this court
must reject such a restrictive view in light of the authorities cited
above [Vetco, Bank of Nova Scotia, Banca Della Svizzera].
Although the Government of Japan may have valid concerns
about the potential for double taxation arising from the IRS audit,
this interest does not support a conclusion that the IRS request for
information should be denied. The information sought by the IRS
is necessary for a fair and accurate determination of Toyota
U.S.A.'s tax liability. . . . In balancing these factors, it is deter-
mined that enforcement of the summons may be ordered without
offense to the principles of international law.
8 9
With regard to the so-called good faith test, the outcome has simi-
larly become predictable. The good faith test has been applied by
some courts, following the Societd Internationale precedent, to decide
whether a subpoena should be enforced through sanctions. In con-
trast the balancing of interests test has been used, on the first level of
a two-tier test, to decide whether a discovery order should be issued
at all."9° While the U.S. Supreme Court in the Societd Internationale
case gave considerable weight to the plaintiff's good faith efforts,
19
recent cases seem to follow this line only if convenient. A striking
example is Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States. 92 The district court en-
forced an IRS summons directed at Chase Manhattan Bank regard-
ing its customer Garpeg's accounts at all branches, including Hong
Kong. Despite the preliminary injunction of a Hong Kong court
prohibiting compliance with the order, and although Chase's good
faith efforts were not disputed, the Court imposed a fine of $10,000
per day. The reasoning was, briefly summarized, as follows: the So-
cieti Internationale precedent was distinguished because it related to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, and 420(2)(b) of the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law (Revised) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) adopting the good faith
test was not considered because the Second Circuit had not yet
adopted this provision. Finally it was argued that sanctions such as
those in Societi Internationale would not have helped anyway under
189. Toyota, 569 F. Supp. at 1163, 1164. For a sceptical discussion of the interest balanc-
ing test see also Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S. Discovery: A Conflict of Na-
tional Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1061, 1071-73 (1984).
190. See Rosdeitcher, supra, note 189, at 1066-71. The Second Circuit has not adopted the
distinction, cf. Banca Della Svizzera, 92 F.R.D. at 117 n.3. ("Such a distinction in analysis
makes little, if any, practical difference"); see also Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis
Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320, 1346 (1983).
191. Societd Internationale, 357 U.S. at 201-03.
192. 588 F. Supp. 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the circumstances. The criminal liability Chase might incur under
sections 53 and 60 of the Hong Kong Banking Ordinance' 93 was ig-
nored for the most part and Chase's possible civil liability to its client
was dispatched with a remark that it would cause little hardship to a
bank like Chase to pay the damages.
Even if a court is willing to apply the good faith test, it seems
almost impossible to evaluate compliance with the test's require-
ments.1 94 The party or witness whose good faith is to be examined,
finds himself in an uneasy situation. Although he does not want to
comply with the discovery order, he is required to take, at least for-
mally, all possible efforts to get the disclosure authorized by the for-
eign authorities.' 9 Basing a decision on the existence or absence of
such efforts, usually does not make much sense. It therefore appears
that the doubts concerning the workability of the good faith and bal-
ancing tests expressed at the beginning of this chapter are justified.
In view of the elusiveness of the interest balancing and good faith
tests, it seems that courts need more workable guidelines if there is to
be more certainty and restraint in the area of enforcement
jurisdiction.
2. Relative Territoriality. The approach used in the foregoing
case analysis tries to provide such guidelines. It is based on a refined
understanding of the traditional international law principle of territo-
riality which, it is suggested, should be recognized by courts and
agencies as a principle limiting their enforcement jurisdiction in in-
ternational cases.' 96 Recent decisions have shown that U.S. courts
are aware of limits imposed by international law.' 97 Also, in the
literature "the needs of the international system" have been taken
into consideration.198 Certainly, a refined understanding of the terri-
toriality principle, which recognizes the realities of the modern
world, cannot provide rules of absolute certainty. The test is not: are
the requested documents within the territory, but rather: do they
193. Reprinted in Staff Study of the Crime and Secrecy, supra note 124, at 214.
194. For the criteria to be considered see Note, supra note 190, at 1347-48.
195. Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 126, at 634-35.
196. The question is not only relevant for U.S. authorities; the regulatory activities of other
States, e.g. the antitrust policy in West Germany (cf. section 98 II of the Law Against Re-
straints on Competition), or within the EC, have caused similar problems.
197. See Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 636 F.2d 1300; supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
198. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Pub-
lic and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 198, 280, 281 (1982).
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concern territory-related activities? The courts retain considerable
flexibility in deciding whether such a relationship exists.
The significance of the approach suggested here lies in two
points: First, the physical situs of the documents becomes much less
important and second, the test does not involve a weighing of inter-
ests and policies. This approach therefore does not share the weak-
nesses of balancing approaches, especially the inherent tendency to
favor the forum policy.' 99 It is only after the hurdle of relative terri-
toriality is passed that, on a second level, policy, interest and comity
considerations should come into play. Accordingly, an analysis on
three levels is suggested, examining first whether the requested docu-
ments concern activities sufficiently related with the territory, second
considering the public and private interests involved, and evaluating,
if measurable at all, the parties' good faith.
The case analysis has shown that a first test, based on the con-
cept of relative territoriality, can help to rationalize the decision
making process and to decide a number of cases at the outset without
resort to balancing techniques. For example, this was the situation in
the Toyota case,2"° the same is true with regard to the documentation
of the Havanna-Montreal transfer in Ings v. Ferguson,2 ' and the
Frankfurt located documents in First National City Bank.2" 2 On the
other hand, in Banca Della Svizzera2 3 the documents located in
Switzerland concerned U.S. related activities. In some cases it is pos-
sible to clarify the problem by asking where the "proper" situs of the
documents can be established. Although this has nothing to do with
the physical presence of the documents, the fact that they
"originated" from a specific country may have some relevance.2"
Examples are the decision of the German Supreme Finance Court
20 5
and Bank of Nova Scotia.2 1 In the Vetco 20 7 decision the court cor-
rectly cited section 964(c) I.R.C. which requires the making of docu-
ments concerning business transactions with a U.S. parent's foreign
subsidiary. The existence of such a statute may work as a rebuttable
199. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 46, at 479 with regard to the governmen-
tal interest analysis in the conflict of laws.
200. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
201. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.
202. Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
203. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
204. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 420(l)(c) (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982).
205. Supra note 134 and accompanying text.
206. Supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207. Supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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presumption that the documents it requires concern U.S.-related ac-
tivities.208 No special weight should be given to the distinction be-
tween branches and wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries and to
the question, whether it is the parent company (head office) or sub-
sidiary (branch) of a multinational that is located in the requesting
State. It is true, that U.S. courts generally have held parent corpora-
tions responsible for the production of documents in the possession
of their foreign branches or subsidiaries. However, the fact that in
Great Britain exactly the opposite rule prevails,2°" indicates that the
different results are based on technical distinctions, such as the cus-
tody or control argument, 210 rather than on substantive arguments.
The distinction between parties and witnesses, recognized, for
example, in Ings v. Ferguson,2 ' but ignored in more recent decisions
such as First National City Bank2t 2 or Garpeg,213 does not influence
the test based on relative territoriality. However, this distinction
should be given considerable weight on the second, the comity level.
3. Comity (balancing of interests, good faith). If the require-
ments of relative territoriality are not met courts should deny a re-
quest for discovery orders. The only way to get the desired
information should be through judicial assistance which, in some ar-
eas, has been regulated by international treaties.2t 4 If, on the other
hand, the requested documents concern U.S.-related activities, U.S.
courts have enforcement jurisdiction. Since the foreign State where
the documents are physically located also can claim jurisdiction over
them, conflicts of jurisdiction often arise.215 The concept used to rec-
oncile such conflicts is that of international comity. " 'Comity,' in
the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. '2 6 As
Judge Wilkey put it in Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena:
208. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
209. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 420, Reporters' Note
9 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982); cf. Mann, supra note 73, at 157, 158.
210. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
211. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.
212. Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
213. Supra note 192 and accompanying text.
214. International treaties, often drafted by diplomats rather than lawyers, are usually very
vague. The question arises frequently whether the manner of getting information described in
the treaty is exclusive, or whether the "direct" way through subpoenas is still open. Cf Graco
v. Uremtin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See also Note, The Hague Convention of the
Taking of Evidence Abroad In Civil or Criminal Matters The Exclusive and Mandatory Proce-
dures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1984).
215. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
216. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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'Comity' summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive con-
cept-the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to
the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the fo-
rum. Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances
surrounding each claim for recognition, the absolute boundaries of
the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain."'
In this area of uncertainty, the balancing approaches enunciated in
section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts and sections 419,
420 of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982) can be valuable guidelines for the courts. Various
factors, such as the existence of foreign blocking statutes or secrecy
laws, foreign court injunctions, reactions of foreign governments,
good faith efforts to cooperate or obstructiveness on the side of the
respective parties or witnesses, and the risk of criminal sanctions
have to be taken into consideration and balanced. Good examples of
how the U.S. courts have approached the comity problem, are SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,2" 8 concerning the Swiss banking se-
crecy law and United States v. Vetco,219 concerning the Swiss busi-
ness secrecy law.22 ° In both cases, the fact that the Swiss government
officials did not express a hostile attitude towards disclosure,
221
might have been of considerable importance. However, in the Toyota
case, 222 the Japanese government's formal protest failed to change
the court's decision to enforce the subpoenas. This indicates that in
the tax area enforcement policy arguments are of great importance.
While such arguments should not influence the international law test,
the outcome of the comity test may depend to a large extent on the
subject matter of an investigation. Finally, with regard to the policy
of a foreign State the Court in United States v. First National City
Bank stated:
We would be reluctant to hold. . . that the mere absence of crim-
inal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a sub-
poena . . . . The vital national interests of a foreign nation,
especially in matters relating to economic affairs, can be expressed
in ways other than through criminal law.223
217. 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
218. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
219. Supra note 154 and accompanying text.
220. STGB C.P. COD. PEN. art. 273.
221. 644 F.2d at 1331; 92 F.R.D. at 118.
222. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
223. 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968).
37
Moessle: The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforcement i
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
A. Unilateral-the SEC's "Waiver by Conduct" Concept
1. The "Waiver" Concept. The SEC has made a major attempt
to cope more effectively with the problems it faces in international
investigations. In July 1984 the Commission released a Request for
Comments224 concerning the so-called "waiver by conduct" concept
(waiver concept).225 The objective of this unilateral approach was to
improve the SEC's ability to investigate and prosecute persons who
purchase or sell securities in United States stock markets through
foreign banks or direct orders from foreign countries. Under the
waiver concept the direct or indirect sale or purchase of securities in
the United States markets would constitute
an implied consent to disclosure of information and evidence rele-
vant to the transaction for purposes of any SEC investigation, ad-
ministrative proceeding or action for injunctive relief under the
federal securities laws, in short: a waiver of foreign secrecy rights;
the appointment of the United States broker that executes the
transaction as an agent for service of process and subpoenas; and
a consent to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the United
States courts and the Commission.
226
If the SEC, after reviewing the comments made by interested parties
in response to the Request for Comments, finally decided to maintain
the concept, it would propose a securities laws amendment to Con-
gress. Apart from this, it could be of interest for other areas of U.S.
law. The waiver concept does not concern questions of jurisdiction
to prescribe.22  The impact of the proposed legislation would be on
adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction.228
224. Request for Comments, supra note 2.
225. The concept was first introduced into the discussion by John Fedders who is the Di-
rector of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC. Cf. Fedders, Interdependence and Coopera-
tion: the SEC's "Waiver by Conduct" Concept Release, INT'L FIN. L. REV. Sept. 1984, at 10;
Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the International-
ization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. M. L. I (1984). Cf. the mostly
critical comments in Schorr, "Waiver by Conduct": Another View, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. M.
L. 307-18 (1984); Lepine, A Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct", 6 J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. M. L. 319-21 (1984); Boyle & Thau, The Newest Configuration of the Ugly American: A
Response to Mr. Fedders, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. M. L. 331-37 (1984); De Capitani, Response
to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct", 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. M. L. 339-44 (1984); Singer, The
International Securities Market and International Law-a Reply to John M. Fedders, 6 J.
CoMP. Bus. & CAP. M. L. 345-54 (1984).
226. Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, supra, note 225 at 14.
227. See Request for Comments, supra note 2, at IV A-C.
228. See supra notes 57-114 and accompanying text.
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2. Impact on Jurisdiction to Adjudicate. Adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion exists under United States law, if there are certain minimum
contacts, adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. The waiver
concept addresses both questions. The foreign trader would, by trad-
ing on U.S. securities markets, impliedly consent to in personam ju-
risdiction and impliedly appoint his United States broker-dealer as
agent for the service of ordinary process and subpoenas. 229 Thus, in
cases like SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,23° the courts could,
according to the waiver concept, deal with the question of personal
jurisdiction just by citing the waiver by conduct statute.
This approach has, with regard to interstate law, well-known
precedents. In Hess v. Pawlowski23' the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts nonresident motorist statute
based on implied consent and the implied appointment of an
agent. 232 The holding of Hess rests on the dangerous character of the
operation of motor vehicles. "In the public interest the State may
make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care
on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its high-
ways. ' 233 In Doherty & Co. v. Goodman234 D, a New York citizen
trading as "Doherty & Co." operated an office in Iowa for the sale of
corporate securities throughout the State. K, in charge of the office,
was served with process under an Iowa statute in a suit against D for
damages arising out of a sale of stock in Iowa by D's salesman. D
had never consented to service nor authorized K to be his agent for
that purpose, but the statute authorized service on corporations or
individuals who had an office for the "transaction of any business"
within the state. In upholding jurisdiction the Supreme Court noted
that Iowa treated as "exceptional" the business of dealing in corpo-
rate securities and subjected it to special regulation, finding support
229. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
230. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
231. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
232. The Statute read in part:
[T]he operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle on a public way in the common-
wealth. . . shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the
registrar or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may
be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of
any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a
motor vehicle on such a way, and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification
of his agreement that any such process against him which is so served shall be of the
same legal force and validity as if served upon him personally.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
234. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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in the decisions concerning nonresident motorists. 235 It is obvious
that the real basis for jurisdiction in such cases was not consent, im-
plied or express, but the potentially dangerous nature of the activi-
ties, likely to cause personal or economic injury to residents.
Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co.2 3 6 concerned whether, under
a nonresident motorist statute, the driving of an automobile also
could constitute a waiver to improper venue. Justice Frankfurter
stated:
This is a horse soon curried. . . . It is true that in order to ease
the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-existing
modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that
the reason why a non-resident can be subjected to a state's juris-
diction is that the non-resident has 'impliedly' consented to be
sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases
does not rest on consent at all. The defendant may protest to high
heaven his unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not. .. .
The same is true with regard to the SEC's "waiver" concept. As the
SEC itself points out, "[t]here would be an irrebuttable presumption
that the consent is valid. ' 238 Despite the deceptive label, it is under-
stood that the "waiver by conduct" approach, like its interstate pred-
ecessors, in fact does not depend on consent.
At this point one should remember that the courts already have
interpreted SEA § 27 and SA § 22(b) very broadly as federal long-
arm statutes, limited only by due process.2 39 Taking into account the
fictitious nature of the waiver concept, one cannot but conclude that,
with regard to the required minimum contacts, the proposed legisla-
tion would not change anything. The only limitation has been and
will be the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 ' For ex-
ample, a foreign bank trading on American markets on its own or on
behalf of its customers are likely to be held subject to United States
adjudicatory jurisdiction for related claims even if the trading were a
single act. In the case of the bank's foreign customer the question
235. Id.
236. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
237. Id. at 340, 341 (emphasis added).
238. Request for Comments, supra note 2, citing Sakol v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 574 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978) (emphasis added).
239. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
240. The SEC itself admits, "this would not be necessary to establish U.S. jurisdiction," but
wrongfully adds, "it would reduce the possibility that defendants might contest the existence of
in personam jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis." Requests for Comments, supra note 2, at
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depends on the circumstance. A large, sophisticated investor will
probably be able to reasonably calculate and foresee whether the or-
dered transaction is to be executed on United States markets. United
States courts will assume jurisdiction. On the other hand a small
investor who is indifferent as to whether a bank buys on the London,
Zurich or New York stock exchanges, will most likely not be subject
to the personal jurisdiction of a United States court. The concern
expressed in some of the comment letters that the proposed legisla-
tion would apply in unpredictable and unfair circumstances,24" ' is
therefore not justified. A different question, of course, is whether the
SEC acted wisely in proposing a "consent" to personal jurisdiction
provision, the sole effect of which can be to expose the waiver concept
as a whole to more criticism.
As far as the notice requirement is concerned, the proposed "im-
plied" appointment of United States broker-dealers as agents for ser-
vice of ordinary process and subpoenas, would be without doubt
helpful in cases where service otherwise had to be made in a foreign
country.242 There are, however, two problems: The validity of such
a service, and the burden imposed thereby upon the private partici-
pants (broker-dealers and banks). Valid service presupposes that
"[t]he notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the re-
quired information .... "24' True, "the practicalities and peculiari-
ties of the case" have to be considered, but "process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. 
2
"
In presenting its waiver concept, the SEC declares: "while the
statute need not impose a requirement that U.S. broker-dealers for-
ward such subpoenas or court papers, it is likely that the firms would
transmit the documents to their customers abroad" 241 and also, "[i]t
is likely ... that foreign banks and other intermediaries would
transmit the documents to their customers in view of their duties as
agents. '2 46 It is at least open to some doubt whether a method of
service, which relies upon the voluntary cooperation of private enti-
241. Cf, e.g., Comment Letter, American Bar Association, 16 (Nov. 1984).
242. Cf., supra notes 196-213 and accompanying text.
243. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
244. The Supreme Court also points out that "in the case of persons missing or unknown,
employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situa-
tion permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights." Id. at
317. The holding is limited because it concerns a case where a trustee tried to get a judicial
settlement of accounts terminating its liability towards the beneficiaries; it does not apply to
situations where positive claims are being enforced, nor to subpoenas.
245. Request for Comments, supra note 2, at W.B.
246. Id.
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ties to achieve actual notice, is reasonably calculated to convey the
required information. Even if actual notice were obtained, there
would remain some doubt whether such service is proper under
Wuchter v. Pizzuti.247 The validity of the holding in Wuchter may be
argued today,248 but there remains at least some uncertainty while
the waiver concept is supposed to create "litigation certainty.
249
A further question, not of United States constitutional, but of
international law, is whether service of a subpoena by mail to a for-
eign country will, even though formally accomplished by a private
United States brokerage firm,250 be considered a violation of sover-
eignty by the concerned State.251 The problem can be acute in coun-
tries such as France where the mere "ask[ing by any person] for...
information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or
technical nature that may constitute proof with a view to legal or
administrative proceedings in another country. . ." may cause crim-
inal liability up to six months' imprisonment and (or) a fine up to
$30,000.
25
2 This concerns both the burdens which the waiver con-
cept would impose upon private parties and, again, whether the cho-
sen method of service is reasonably calculated to give actual notice.
If France or a country with similar provisions is involved, it appears
unlikely that either a brokerage firm or a foreign bank would be will-
ing to forward the documents and thereby expose themselves to crim-
inal liability. Thus, also with regard to the problems of service, the
waiver concept is of doubtful workability.
3. Impact on Enforcement Jurisdiction. (a) The main problems
in the areas of securities law enforcement differ, at least partially,
from those in the areas of antitrust or tax law. If, for example, a
foreign issuer sells securities on United States markets25 3 or a foreign
investor purchases or sells, directly or indirectly, securities on United
247. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
248. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
249. Request for Comments, supra note 2, at V.A.4.
250. See Comment Letter, Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade 13 (Nov. 30, 1984). "It
is unlikely that indirect service of process . . .will be viewed as any less offensive by any
foreign government."
251. See Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1313 n.69, citing a Swiss aide-memoire
from November 1981 in which Switzerland protests the service by mail of judicial documents
on Swiss residents by a U.S. agency, as a consequence of which the Department of State offi-
cially apologized. Kerley, Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to International Law, 56
AM. J. INT'L L. 793, 794 (1962).
252. French Law No. 80-538, arts. l(a), 3 (1980); cited in Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 636
F.2d at 1326 n.146.
253. SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
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States exchanges,254 the activities are U.S.-related and a request for
the production of the respective documents causes little problems
under the relative territoriality test.2 5' The main problems appear on
the second level of analysis, comity, where the impact of foreign se-
crecy laws and blocking statutes on the exercise of U.S. enforcement
jurisdiction has to be considered. The waiver concept as a unilateral
approach, would not affect the first level of analysis concerning inter-
national law, but would influence the considerations of comity on the
second level of analysis, by expressing the legislature's strong interest
in enforcing U.S. securities laws.
(b) The essence of a statutory "waiver" of foreign secrecy laws.
It seems unlikely, despite assertions to the contrary, that the Com-
mission really believed in the possibility of "piercing the veil" of for-
eign secrecy laws simply by characterizing certain activities as an
"implied waiver" of these laws. The waiver concept looks like a
"backdoor" approach to an objective which could not be reached by
the direct way. In 1970 Congress considered and rejected the "di-
rect" approach. The Senate bill which served as the basis for the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 contained a provision that would have
granted the SEC authority to prevent United States broker-dealers
from dealing with foreign financial firms, unless such a firm disclosed
its principal or certified that it was not acting for a United States
citizen or resident.
256
Another conceivable "direct" approach would be similar to Se-
curities Exchange Act rule.17a-.7 which applies to nonresident bro-
kers and dealers:
(a)(1) each nonresident broker or dealer registered . . . shall
keep, maintain and preserve. . . true, correct, complete and cur-
rent copies of the books and records which he is required to make
. . . pursuant to . . . any rule or regulation of the Commission
adopted under the Act ...
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) hereof, a
nonresident broker or dealer. . . need not keep or preserve within
the United States copies. . . and records referred to in said para-
graph (a), if:
(1) Such broker or dealer files with the Commission . . . a
254. Cf Banca della Svizzera, supra note 180.
255. See supra notes 196-213 and accompanying text. However, in cases like Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, where jurisdiction to prescribe goes extremely far, most of
the documentary evidence abroad, would probably have to be characterized as nonrelated to
U.S. activities.
256. See Comment Letter, Institute of Foreign Bankers, Inc., 10 (Dec. 1, 1984).
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written undertaking in form acceptable to the Commission. . . to
furnish to the Commission, upon demand,. . . true, correct, com-
plete and current copies of. . .books and records which he is
required to make .... 257
Theoretically nothing prevents the SEC from enunciating a compara-
ble rule with regard to foreign banks or investors trading on United
States securities markets. Indeed, in 1976 the SEC proposed an
amendment to Rule 17a-3(a)(9). It would have required, as a basic
condition of participation in the United States securities markets,
that "those who act on behalf of undisclosed principals establish in
advance, by written agreement, their willingness to disclose to the
Commission, upon request, the identity of their principals. 25 8 The
proposed rule received substantial negative comment and was never
acted upon.259
Under the waiver concept a foreign bank would have to ask it-
self a similar question: will it be able to produce the required infor-
mation when one of its clients has become a target of SEC
investigations. The only safe way would be to obtain up front, before
executing any purchase or sale order, a valid waiver of its client's
secrecy rights. These would, as a practical matter, require some sort
of written consent. 2 ' Nevertheless, the SEC contends that the "ap-
proach would impose no paperwork burdens and no special proce-
dures upon foreign banks or brokerage firms." 26' A bank, relying on
this statement, might easily find itself in the "tragic" position of be-
ing guilty without guilt. The SEC therefore cautiously recommends:
Although not required by law to do so, a foreign bank might deter-
mine that it would be prudent to give its customers notice of a
United States 'waiver-by-conduct' law or to adopt procedures to
assure that it does not effect securities transactions in the United
States without the knowledge and consent of a customer.262
The presumption made above, that the SEC itself does not be-
lieve in a waiver of foreign secrecy laws by the described conduct, has
proved to be true. This is true at least with regard to foreign inves-
tors not resident in the United States.26a The SEC's real objective is
257. S.E.A. §§ 17(a)(1), (b)(1).
258. SEC, Records With Respect to Beneficial Ownership of Accounts Carried by Brokers
and Dealers, Release No. 34-13149, p. 16 (Jan. 10, 1977).
259. See Comment Letter, supra note 250, at 5.
260. Cf. supra note 122 and accompanying text.
261. Request for Comments, supra note 2, at n.36; "The Commission recognizes that there
may be unanticipated burdens." Id. at V.B.2.
262. Id. at V.B.2; see also Comment Letter, supra note 250, at 22, 23.
263. Cf. the definition of nonresident brokers and dealers in S.E.A. § 17(c)(3).
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to get, by unilateral action, some of the results it obtained through
bilateral negotiations in the American-Swiss Memorandum of Un-
derstanding. Under this agreement the Swiss banks are de facto re-
quired to obtain a waiver of banking secrecy laws from their clients
before effecting transactions on United States markets.2
With regard to resident investors it would, under choice of law
principles, seem reasonable for both United States and foreign courts
to consider their trading on United States markets through foreign
banks and under a waiver statute as an implied waiver. The conti-
nental principle of "ignorance of the law being no defense" would
apply to resident investors while, in view of foreign investors, it
would be inapplicable with regard to United States law.265
(c) The 'waiver' concept's workability. The concept is said to in-
clude potential benefits such as deterrence, voluntary cooperation,
diplomatic efforts and cost effectiveness.266 It must therefore be mea-
sured against these criteria.
A bank, sitting in a country with banking secrecy laws, would
have three options under the proposed legislation: (1) Get valid
waivers from its customers. (2) Stop trading on United States mar-
kets.267 (3) Trade on United States markets without having obtained
a waiver and incur the risk of discovery orders. The waiver concept
can only be successful, if alternative (1) or (3) or a mix of (1) and (3)
are likely to be more profitable than alternative (2). Otherwise the
proposed legislation will divert trading away from United States se-
curities markets.
Viewed from the foreign investor's perspective, the following
four alternatives exist: (1) sign a written consent; (2) stop trading on
U.S. markets; (3) keep trading without giving a waiver (if possible)
and try, in case of a discovery order, to prevent the bank from dis-
closing, ultimately by court injunction; (4) keep trading on the U.S.
markets but put several "layers" of intermediaries between the bank
and the investor. Again, the waiver concept will only be successful, if
alternatives (1) and (3) prevail.
It seems to be obvious that the SEC, even after enactment of the
proposed legislation, would still confront the following difficulties.
First, if both bank and investor chose alternative (3), the SEC may be
264. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
265. Cf Comment Letter, Banking Federation of the European Community, 2 (Nov. 27,
1984).
266. Request for Comments, supra note 2, V.A.
267. For the availability of off-shore markets see Staff Study, supra note 124, at 49-95.
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able to enforce a discovery order more easily against the bank. How-
ever, if the foreign bank asks for a declaratory judgment in a foreign
court that the disclosure is legal, or if the foreign government at-
taches the documents, the enforcement efforts of the SEC would have
to continue before the foreign courts or in negotiations with the for-
eign government. Thus, as the American Bar Association's comment
letter points out, "it appears . . . more likely that the various steps
which the Commission must take in the foreign jurisdiction are not
likely to be shortened, and indeed may be lengthened, by reason of
the short-circuited proceedings in this country., 268 Second, if a for-
eign investor-for whatever reason-chooses alternative (4), he can
easily hide his identity by purchasing stock in the name of a "nomi-
nee." '2 69 Third, the waiver concept is not supposed to cope with the
problem of blocking statutes,270 the protection of which cannot be
waived by private parties.
(d) Policy questions. Apart from its legal insufficiencies, the
waiver concept appears to be inconsistent with recent efforts by Con-
gress and the Department of the Treasury in connection with the
repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax. 27 1 The waiver concept
might have the tendency to divert trading from U.S. markets, thus
promoting the creation and growth of off-shore markets. 272 It is
noteworthy that already in 1976, 296 major United States corpora-
tions had also listed their securities on foreign exchanges, primarily
in Amsterdam, London and Zurich.273 Yet, it has been suggested
that, at least today, "there exist no comparable alternatives to the
United States markets in terms of breadth, liquidity, stability, integ-
rity and availability of United States securities. ' 274 Whether this sit-
uation is going to change substantially within the near future is open
to considerable doubt. If it does, the "waiver" concept is not likely
to be a significant factor in such a development.
A more serious concern seems to be that the waiver concept may
268. Id. at 20.
269. See Fischer, The Mysterious Bank Nominee, 89 BANKING L.J. 911 (1972); see also
Comment Letter, American Bar Association 12 (Nov. 1984).
270. See Request for Comments, supra note 2, at VI; for blocking statutes generally see text
supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
271. The purpose of the repeal was to make foreign investment in the United States more
attractive and to cope with the balance of payments problem. Cf Comment Letter, The Gen-
eral Counsel of the Treasury 2 (Nov. 28, 1984).
272. Cf Comment Letter, supra note 256, at 5-9; Comment Letter, supra note 250, at I I.
273. Response of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to SEC Release No. 34-13149 (Jan.
1977), p. 10 and Annex A (1977).
274. Comment Letter, supra note 250, at 11.
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provoke the enactment of blocking legislation in countries which
have not enacted such laws as yet. Such a trend toward a legal "war"
rather than judicial cooperation is highly undesirable.
(e) Summary. The proposed waiver legislation serves only to a
very limited extent, if at all, its purpose of making securities law en-
forcement proceedings more efficient.27
-Personal jurisdiction. "Consent," in the form of an irrebut-
table presumption, is a fiction. Absent real consent, courts would
still have to examine-as they do now under SEA § 27, SA § 22(b)--
whether assuming jurisdiction in a given case would violate due
process.
-Notice. Serious doubt remains as to whether service upon a
United States broker-dealer would be constitutionally sufficient
under all circumstances, especially with regard to subpoenas.
-Secrecy Laws. Foreign protective legislation has not been an
unsurmountable hurdle for United States discovery orders in the past
decade. Whether the purchase or sale of securities on United States
markets can be interpreted as an implied waiver of foreign secrecy
rights will, as a practical matter, finally be decided by a foreign fo-
rum. The foreign court might decide that secrecy rights have validly
been waived where United States residents are concerned and the
bank could disclose its American clients' names. However, if a client
has interposed a foreign bank "nominee", the waiver concept does
not work.
The proposed legislation's benefits being minimal, the psycho-
logical damage with regard to alienating or offending foreign States
and international business could be considerable.
-There may be a slight risk of diverting trading from United
States to off-shore markets.
-More foreign States may be induced to enact blocking statutes
or issue protective orders; the climate for bilateral or multilateral ne-
gotiations would deteriorate to legal war.
The SEC should abandon its proposal. Alternatives to the
waiver concept, as proposed by some of the comment letters, include:
the creation of a "Foreign Traders List" similar to the SEC's Foreign
275. The comments of the business community and most foreign States have--not very
surprisingly-been negative. The few positive comments include those of. The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (confronted with similar problems as the SEC); Prof. Richard W.
Jennings, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley; Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, New York
University. See also Lpine, supra note 225, at 319-21 (1984). Lpine is Secrbtaire Gen6ral,
Commission des Oprations de Bourse, Paris.
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Restricted List;276 reform of substantive law in identified problem ar-
eas such as tender offer and option regulation; 277 and continuing dip-
lomatic efforts. International negotiations which are not restricted to
the intergovernmental level, but include foreign financial institutions
such as the American-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding could
be especially fruitful.
2 78
B. Bilateral-Memorandum of Understanding between The United
States and Switzerland
1. Background-the "Santa Fe" Case.279  Prior to the an-
nouncement of a merger between Santa Fe and Kuwait Petroleum
corporations significant purchases of Santa Fe stock and stock op-
tions were made. The transactions were partially effected by Swiss
banks. The SEC asked for disclosure of the bank's clients and based
its request on the treaty on legal assistance in criminal matters be-
tween Switzerland and the United States from 1977.28° While the
Federal Bureau of Police decided to grant assistance under the treaty,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in January 1983, reversed that de-
cision. 2 1 The problem with the treaty was that judicial assistance
was only available where double criminal liability was found. The
Swiss Supreme Court tested several provisions of the Swiss penal
code and concluded that there was no special provision dealing with
insider trading.
Article 162 of the Swiss Criminal Code sanctions the disclosure
of industrial or commercial secrets by "insiders", for example, per-
sons under a legal or contractual duty to secrecy. This leads to the
paradoxical result that trading by the insider himself (without disclo-
sure of any secrecy) is not a criminal offense under Swiss law today.
The same is true for insider trading by a tippee, if the tippor has not
disclosed to the tippee any commercial secret.28 2 Only if the insider-
tippor has disclosed to the tippee a commercial secret have both tip-
276. Comment Letter, American Bar Association, 24-25; cf also supra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text. This technique is already used in connection with the foreign issuers ex-
emption under rule 12(g)(3)-(2).
277. Comment Letter, Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade, 8 (Nov. 30, 1984).
278. Cf. Comment Letter, Prof. Lowenfeld, 8-9 (Nov. 26, 1984).
279. No. 81 Civ. 6553 WCC (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See Request for Comments, supra note 2, at
II.A.2.
280. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (in force Jan. 23, 1977).
281. Judgement of Jan. 26, 1983 Supreme Court, Switz., RO 109 1 b, 47.
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por and tippee committed a criminal offense under Article 162.
However, since Article 162 is not mentioned in the relevant "Annex"
to the U.S.-Swiss treaty as a crime for which judicial assistance ordi-
narily is granted, the treaty can successfully be invoked only if, the
alleged criminal offense is of special importance.
In an unpublished case, "Antoniu and Courtois," the Swiss Fed-
eral Bureau of Police granted assistance on this basis, special impor-
tance, and its decision was upheld by the Federal Supreme Court.28 3
This situation with its inconsistencies in the criminal treatment of
insider trading and its uncertainty in the area of legal assistance has
lead to two major developments. First, it caused an intensive discus-
sion aimed at reform of insider trading legislation.284 Second,
although the time was not considered ripe for reform of the Swiss
criminal law, a so-called Memorandum of Understanding was signed
as an intermediary step.
2. The Memorandum of Understanding and the Private Agree-
ment Among Members of the Swiss Bankers'Association. The Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) is a "statement of intent setting
forth the understandings reached by the delegations of Switzerland
and the United States acting on behalf of their respective govern-
ments. . . to establish mutually acceptable means for improving in-
ternational law enforcement cooperation in the field of insider
trading."28 Section III of the MOU outlines the content of a private
agreement among members of the Swiss Banker's Association the
purpose of which is to bridge the time before enactment of Swiss
criminal insider legislation.
The Agreement can be simply summarized. If, within 25 days
prior to the announcement of a tender offer or a take-over attempt, a
customer gives an order for a transaction on United States securities
markets concerning the respective companies, the Swiss bank will,
under certain conditions and upon request of the SEC, disclose the
customer's name and other relevant information to a special "Com-
mission. '  The "Commission" is created by the Administrative
283. Unpublished decision cited in materials distributed at the Geneva Colloquium on In-
sider Trading and Judicial Assistance 330 (Mar. 1984).
284. This activity is no longer considered a "gentlemen's delict." Nobel, supra note 282, at
nn. 1,2.
285. MOU sec. 1.1, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983). Cf Greene, U.S.-Swiss Memorandum of Under-
standing on Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REV. Jan. 1983, at 26; Aubert, supra note 11, at
289-93; Honegger, supra note 11I, at 21-37.
286. MOU, supra note 285, at art. I.
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Council of the Swiss Bankers' Association.287 The "Commission"
deals with SEC requests under certain conditions including among
other things, that the SEC keep the information confidential.288 Such
provisions of confidentiality will probably be of increasing impor-
tance in the field of international judicial assistance. 289 Every inter-
national agreement in this area should give considerable weight to
questions of confidentiality. The problems, even in pure domestic
cases, are far from being resolved, for example in the area of parallel
civil and criminal proceedings. 29
The Commission is entitled to give the information obtained
from the bank to the SEC, unless the customer concerned proves that
he is neither (1) an insider by virtue of his position, nor (2) an insider
by virtue of his function,29' nor (3) a person who got the inside infor-
mation from an insider (according to (1) or (2)) and could thereby
act on behalf of such person or take advantage of the information
himself.292 The Swiss bank is obligated to block, upon the "Commis-
sion's" request, the customer accounts up to the amount of the profit
(or avoided loss) resulting from the transaction. If, inter alia, a judg-
ment is rendered against the customer in a United States court, the
bank transfers the illegal profits to the SEC.29 3 Finally, the bank is
obligated to inform the clients about the Convention in an adequate
form.
2 9 4
Without doubt the MOU, despite some unanswered questions
concerning its validity under Swiss constitutional law, 29 5 could pro-
vide a model for further bilateral agreements.
296
C. Multilateral Efforts
In view of the relatively short history of insider trading regula-
tion and the great disparity among the national approaches to the
287. Id. at art. 2.
288. Id. at art. 3.
289. See Lowenfeld, supra note 278, at 3.
290. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
291. Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
292. MOU, supra note 285, at art. 5. The second alternative of three goes further than
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); cf the
critical comment of Wilson, "Insider Trading" und Amerikanische Rechtsprechung, Neue
Zurcher Zeitung (Sept. 8, 1983).
293. MOU, supra note 285, at art. 9.
294. MOU, supra note 285, at art. 12. See also supra note 122 and accompanying text.
295. Cf the critical remarks of Reichwein, Kritische Bemerkungen zur Insider-Konvention,
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, (Mar. 12/13, 1983).
296. For an assessment of the value of the MOU see Honegger, supra note 120, at 31-33.
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problem, it is not surprising that multilateral efforts directed at in-
sider trading law are rare. First attempts have been made by the
European Commission and by the Council of Europe to address the
question. A Colloquy on "Insider Trading," organized under the
auspices of the Council of Europe in 1983, came to the following
conclusions:
In the circumstances, the Colloquy acknowledged that it would be
useful for the Council of Europe to take action in co-operation
with the other international organizations concerned, notably the
European Communities.
Such action should, firstly, be geared to the drafting of an
international convention which because of all the peculiarities of
the problem of insider trading, would set up a system of interna-
tional mutual assistance specifically for insider trading and would
complement the existing instruments. All the aspects of the prob-
lem-administrative, civil and criminal-should be dealt with in
the instrument. 297
The second step, should be the harmonization of insider trading leg-
islation in the various European countries. However, its realization
seems to be a long way off even though only European countries are
concerned. Therefore, at least for the near future, unilateral and pos-
sibly some bilateral efforts are most likely to dominate international
enforcement of the securities laws of the United States and other
countries.
297. Council of Europe document No. 82.692.2, at 288 of the materials distributed at the
Colloquy (copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal).
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